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Abstract 
Qualitative small-N comparisons face the challenge to detect context-bound causality under 
conditions of limited empirical diversity. Rather than treating context as a causal factor, we 
test the usefulness of the novel method of Comparative Multilevel Analysis (CMA) to identify 
and understand the role of context as a contingent necessary condition that enables a causal 
relationship to unfold. Combining CMA with pairwise comparisons, we assess how organ 
donation policies in Switzerland and Spain affect relatives’ refusal rates in a small-N setting 
exhibiting multiple contextual levels. To tackle limited diversity systematically, we suggest to 
refine the CMA methodology by accounting for several contexts and referring to higher-order 
constructs. Applying CMA with these refinements, we find voluntary information measures 
only affect refusal rates in contexts of a credible state explicitly supporting organ donation. 
The fact that CMA can easily be combined with other analytical and conceptual approaches 
makes it an effective technique to identify contextual effects in small-N research. 
 
Keywords: Comparative Multilevel Analysis, contextual effects, small-N comparison, limited 
empirical diversity 
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1 Introduction 
Recent years have witnessed unprecedented methodological progress in qualitative research 
(e.g. Blatter & Haverland, 2012¸ Levi-Faur, 2006; Ragin, 2000). One challenge arising from 
non-linear, complex causality and interdependencies between cases (“Galton’s problem”) is 
the need to be “attentive to the interaction between causal mechanisms and the context in 
which they operate” (Falleti & Lynch, 2009, p. 2). Policy sciences and realist evaluation 
approaches acknowledge that contextual embedding is required to understand how 
governance concepts turn into effective policy configurations (Pawson, 2002; Voss et al., 
2009). The assumption of context-bound causality implies that context sometimes affects only 
the operation of a causal mechanism, without being a cause for the outcome itself (Blatter & 
Haverland, 2012; Goertz, 1994). A novel analytical framework adopting this perspective is 
Comparative Multilevel Analysis (CMA) for comparing subsystems from different contexts in 
small-N research (Denk, 2010).  
This paper uses CMA to identify the role of different policy instruments for relatives’ low 
refusal rates to organ donation. A public policy instrument is a set of techniques by which 
public actors “wield their power in attempting to ensure support and effect or prevent social 
change” (Vedung, 1998, p. 21). Existing studies suggest that a plethora of policy instruments 
matter for relatives’ refusal rates (X, 2011), depending on the analytical level or context they 
focus on. The organ donation process constitutes a proptotypical example of how causation is 
characterized by “many variables, few cases” and context-bound (Byrne, 2009). Similar 
perceptions of the organ donation issue may diffuse within cultural and political contexts, 
which alter how instruments affect people’s decisions (Braun & Gilardi, 2006).  
Contrary to the basic setting imagined by Denk (2010), our contextual setting is itself multi-
levelled. We compare small hospitals and large hospitals in two contrasting national contexts: 
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Spain as the international example of best practice, with very low refusal rates, and 
Switzerland, which exhibits comparatively high refusal rates despite having adopted elements 
of the Spanish model, with a pronounced regional variation between German-speaking and 
French- and Italian-speaking cantons. 
Based on the premise that CMA assesses a specific effect of context as changing meaning 
(Goertz, 1994), our application suggests that CMA helps researchers to identify whether 
causal relationships in genuine small-N settings are linear, i.e. hold across contexts, or non-
linear, i.e. contingent upon the context which implies interdependencies between cases 
(Goertz & Starr, 2003; Ross & Homer, 1976). Simultaneously, our analysis identifies clear 
limitations of CMA in handling equifinality and limited diversity at the context level. One of 
CMA’s main advantages is that it can easily be complemented with other techniques and 
methods (Denk & Lehtinen, 2013). This allows us to propose practical refinements of the 
CMA-approach. These involve accounting for several contexts, and reducing the number of 
variables by resorting to higher-level theoretical constructs. Applying CMA with these 
refinements, we find that voluntary information measures only unfold an effect on refusal 
rates in the context of a credible state explicitly supporting organ donation. 
We now discuss relevant aspects of causal complexity and explain how the CMA 
methodology can address them. Section three presents the outcome, case selection, 
explanatory and contextual factors and our analytical strategy. Section four continues with the 
empirical analysis. We discuss the major findings in section five, while chapter 6 wraps up 
our concluding remarks. 
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2 Complex causation, contextual effects and Comparative 
Multilevel Analysis 
2.1 Causal complexity and Galton’s Problem 
Case-based research typically asserts that, while causality is real, it is also complex. 
Complexity arises from the fact that systems are made up of many layered components that 
interact in non-simple ways (Byrne, 2009; Glennan, 2010). Complexity implies that causal 
relationships as middle-range theories may vary over time and space (Goertz, 1994; Pawson, 
2002). Cases may not constitute causally independent observations: temporal or spatial 
interdependencies produce diffusion processes, thus creating a specific context for functional 
intra-system explanations. The latter might not appear linear when cases are compared across, 
e.g., temporal, cultural, regional or national contexts in which these diffusion mechanisms are 
absent (“Galton’s problem”; Braun & Gilardi, 2006). As a consequence, scholars often 
dismiss functional in favour of contextual explanations (Ross & Homer, 1976). However, 
these interdependencies may also indicate the non-linearity of some political interactions: the 
same outcome might be generated by different causal factors, depending on the context 
(equifinality; Ragin, 2000). Critical realism, realist evaluation and the policy sciences 
approach therefore assert that causality is inherently context-bound (Byrne, 2009; Voss et al., 
2009). Context-bound causality implies to distinguish generative mechanisms of a policy and 
its contiguous context, where the latter triggers the former (Pawson, 2002). A comprehensive 
solution to Galton’s problem accounts for both diffusion and function, by comparing cases 
within and across contexts and including the relevant external variables (Ross & Homer, 
1976). CMA enables researchers to do both, by adressing simultaneously the possibility of 
context-bound causality (comparing across contexts) and the “too many variables, too few 
cases” issue (limited empirical diversity) which often arises in small-N research when more 
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variables are added to an explanation. 
2.2 Comparative Multilevel Analysis as an approach to context-bound 
causality 
Comparative Multilevel Analysis (Denk, 2010) proposes a fairly simple set of four 
completions to conventional qualitative comparative methodology which facilitate the 
analysis of context-bound causality in small-N research.  
The first step of a CMA study consists in grouping cases in relation to their similarities at the 
system level, thereby creating different subsystems within a multilevel structure. Second, 
intrasystem analysis compares cases within each group. This produces as many comparative 
expressions of a causal relationship between explanatory factors and outcomes as there are 
groups. Third, intersystem analyses compare the comparative expressions of the groups 
themselves between groups. Fourth and finally, expressions for those grouped comparisons 
are formulated. These expressions describe whatever differences (D) or similarities (S) exist 
between the grouped cases regarding the relationship between explanatory factors and the 
outcome, and the context (Denk, 2010, p. 33). Differences in these expressions indicate that 
the context impacts on the relationship between the explanatory factors and the outcome. 
Similarities signify that the context does not matter.  
By accounting for contextual factors and their (ir)relevance for causal relationships, CMA 
enables researchers to identify whether causal relations hold across contexts (linear) or 
depend upon the context that implies interdependencies between cases (non-linear). Given 
that Denk (2010) does not discuss these aspects systematically, we now specify how CMA 
can address causal complexity in terms of context-bound causality and limited diversity.  
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First, Denk (2010) only rudimentarily specifies the type of contextual effect that CMA 
assumes. We suggest that CMA does not assess context as a cause of or a barrier to an effect, 
but as a part of the environment changing meaning, affecting how cause and effect interact 
(Goertz, 1994). It refers to context as “the relevant aspects of a setting (analytical, temporal, 
spatial, or institutional) in which a set of initial conditions leads (…) to an outcome (…) that 
is, those [aspects] that allow the mechanism to produce the outcome” (Falleti & Lynch, 2009, 
p. 10). Context C is a contingent necessary condition for a relationship between a cause X and 
an effect Y to unfold (Goertz & Starr, 2003, p.72): only if C, then X  Y (Denk & Lehtinen, 
2013, p. 5). Context as changing meaning can be any social, historical, cultural, political or 
economic factor that influences the relationship between two (or more) variables (Falleti & 
Lynch, 2009, p. 17; Glennan, 2010; Goertz, 1994, pp. 14, 26, 28). In this study, policy 
instruments form the relevant contextual and causal conditions. 
Second, limited diversity makes it difficult to identify the (ir)relevance of the numerous 
variables for the observed differences. The number of variables can be reduced empirically or 
theoretically (Peters, 1998, pp. 70ff). The empirical strategy of intrasystem comparison is, 
however, limited, as it cannot detect whether certain explanatory factors emerge as relevant 
for an outcome only in one context. By including multiple contexts in the analysis, CMA 
surpasses this limitation (Denk, 2010). As another strategy to refine CMA, we apply a more 
parsimonious theory by subsuming policy instruments using higher-order theoretical 
constructs (Cioffi-Revilla & Starr, 2003; Goertz, 2006). 
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3 Materials and methods 
3.1 Case selection and data 
We use CMA to discover which policy instruments impact on the number of refusals by 
deceased patients’ relatives as a share of total requests for organ donation in divergent 
contexts. Swiss refusal rates exceeded Spanish rates by 2.5 times in 2009 (Council of Europe, 
2011). Table 1 also reveals striking differences in refusal rates among the German- speaking 
and French- and Italian-speaking (= Latin) linguistic regions within Switzerland. Finally, 
refusal rates are higher in large than in small hospitals in Switzerland, but not in Spain. The 
contexts shared by geographically proximate hospitals may be linked to the diffusion of 
similar perceptions of organ donation issues (Braun & Gilardi, 2006). Applying Galton’s 
problem here means that this can foster similar ways in which instruments affect people’s 
response to the organ donation request. Our research design must include the relevant 
contexts that could induce such processes (Goertz, 1994). 
We compare large with small hospitals as the smallest units of analysis between which both 
refusal rates and policy instruments vary systematically. Lower levels of aggregation would 
not present new insights. Big hospitals have a division of neurosurgery, whereas small 
hospitals have none (Council of Europe, 2011). We thus compare six cases in five different 
contexts, three regional and two national - the relevant contextual levels at which the organ 
donation system is organized. Contrary to Switzerland, there is no regional variation in policy 
instruments in Spain. Spain’s Model of organ donation was established before the 
decentralization of its health care system. It was implemented in a highly uniform manner in 
all Spanish regions (X, 2011). This is reflected in the low variance of refusal rates across the 
17 Spanish regions ranging from 7.7 to 30 per cent in 2008 (ONT 2008). We expect hospitals 
embedded in the same regional and/or national context to be interdependent. Conversely, 
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apart from comparable organizational backgrounds at the hospital, regional and national level 
resulting from the worldwide diffusion of elements of the Spanish Model (X, 2011, p. 40, 43), 
Swiss and Spanish hospitals should be more independent from each other. 
Our analysis bases on data collected through literature and document analysis and 28 expert 
interviews in both countries (X, 2011). The Spanish sample comprises all hospitals in 2009 
(71 big, 68 small hospitals), whereas data is only available for 50 per cent of the Swiss 
hospitals,1 which are, however, considered representative (X, 2011, pp. 33, 64ff).  
 
3.2 Policy instruments and their classification 
Our analysis focuses on policy instruments, which are crucial for refusal rates. Policy 
instruments in morality policies such as organ donation reflect the relationship between the 
governing and the governed, the broader political and cultural context, and a (de)validation of 
particular sets of norms (Engeli & Varone, 2011; Howlett, 2009; Lascoumes & Le Galès, 
2007). We hence classify our policy instruments according to different degrees of state 
authority exercised (coerciveness), using Vedung’s (1998) tripartite classification into sticks 
(regulations; most coercive), carrots (economic or non-monetary [dis-]incentives) and 
sermons (information; least coercive) (see case studies in X, 2011). Table 1 summarizes the 
research setting and the policy instruments prevailing at different analytical levels. Capital 
letters indicate an instrument’s systematic and encompassing application, otherwise lower 
case letters are used. 
 
- Table 1 here - 
                                                 
1 French part: 2009, 2008: 4 big and 12 small donor action participant hospitals; 2007: 3/13. German part: 2009: 
4 big and 11 small participant hospitals; 2008: 4/15, 2007: 3/16. 
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Policy instruments may figure as causally productive or relevant properties, or as contextual 
background conditions (Glennan, 2010) that act as a “part of the environment” which allows 
the causal mechanism to produce a certain outcome (Denk & Lehtinen, 2013, p. 2; Falletti & 
Lynch, 2009, pp. 10-11). We argue below that only those factors causally affect refusal rates 
that directly influence either the motivation of staff or the decision of individual relatives in 
the situation of the donor request. Conversely, other policy instruments may matter as a 
context for how these causal factors work, if they are neither direct properties of the cause nor 
of the effect (Glennan, 2010). This distinction enables us to address both the question of 
context-bound causality and limited diversity, by reducing the number of possible causal 
factors. Factors that do not vary at at least one level of analysis are not discussed.  
 
Causal factors at the hospital level. As an important sermon, a personal and temporal 
decoupling of the request for organ donation (family approach) from the notification of death 
decreases the likeliness of refusal. Repeating the request several times (“reapproach”) can 
lead inititally undecided relatives to reconsider their decision. The adequate reimbursement of 
donor coordinators is a crucial economic incentive (carrot) for organ procurement. Economic 
resources available determine the efforts and expertise at disposal for family requests. Donor 
transfer represents a negative incentive for relatives: many refusals are due to concerns about 
what will happen with the deceased’s body.  
 
Regional context. Educational programs (sermon) for intensive care nurses, doctors and 
donor coordinators coincide with low refusal rates. They provide the hospital staff involved in 
the core organ recruitment processes with the skills for optimal care and communication 
needed for the family approach to positively affect relatives’ decision.  
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National context. A first national sermon regards public awareness raising (information and 
education) aimed at influencing the population’s knowledge of and attitude toward organ 
donation. While awareness raising does not directly influence donor rates, policy instruments 
are more likely to work as intended in a context of decreased tabooization of, and 
sensitization toward the organ donation topic. Quality monitoring programs provide hospitals 
with information to adapt and improve donation processes.  
Adequate cost coverage (carrot) refers to hospital funding of organ donation processes 
preceding organ retrieval. While this does not affect the relatives’ decision, it is an important 
aspect of the broader setting, which, when absent or incomplete, represents a disincentive for 
the commitment of hospital staff.  
The legal model of consent obliges relatives to take a decision (stick). Under presumed 
consent as practiced in Spain, relatives must express their opposition to donation. By contrast, 
under the explicit/informed consent model used in Switzerland, relatives must explicitly 
express their agreement with donation. There is no unambiguous evidence that presumed 
consent affects refusal rates, but it influences how the precise request is formulated. 
 
Classification. The national context itself is characterized by numerous contextual variables. 
We aim at a more precise statement about what the relevant characteristic of a given context 
is. Is it a subset of these contextual conditions, or rather a first-order characteristic (Cioffi-
Revilla & Starr, 2003), that makes the difference? CMA itself offers no tool to deal with 
limited diversity at the contextual level. Reference to higher-order constructs offers a 
promising strategy to tackle this issue. The numerous contextual conditions can be conceived 
of as exchangeable indicators or secondary-level dimensions of an overarching, basic-level 
concept (Goertz, 2006). This multi-level conception of policy instruments allows us to 
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identify the relevance of different contextual factors, or their underlying characteristics, as 
contingent necessary conditions.  
We identify three conceptual levels for our policy instruments (Table 2): At the indicator 
level, we have differing policy instruments. At a secondary level, these policy instruments can 
be classified as instrument types depending on their coerciveness (sermons, carrots or sticks). 
At the basic level, we identify the criterion explicitness as a higher-order theoretical construct 
that expresses whether governments take an explicit position regarding the values underlying 
a morality policy (Engeli & Varone, 2011). For example, a sermon is more explicit if it 
represents state action aimed at influencing the decision with regard to organ donation, 
compared to a sermon representing a neutral or absent official position in this matter. The 
logical operator “OR” attributes the single instruments as substitutable second-order factors to 
types and varieties of policy instruments. For instance, either edu or QM are empirical 
manifestations of a sermon. In turn, either PC (stick) or AR (sermon) indicates the 
explicitness of the policy instruments in question.  
 
- Table 2 here – 
3.3 Analytical strategy 
CMA requires researchers to choose a method for analyzing causal relationships between 
cases inside contexts (Denk, 2010). Based on our case study insights, we apply Levi-Faur’s 
(2006) techniques of paired comparison, as the number of cases is too low for alternative 
approaches such as Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA; Ragin, 2000).2 
While using a covariational logic, pairwise comparisons integrate a high degree of detail to 
ensure that the causal connections drawn are real (Peters, 1998, pp. 66-67; Tarrow, 2010). 
                                                 
2 Rohlfing (2012) provides a critical discussion on combining CMA with QCA. 
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Table 3 summarizes the inferential strategies (methods of agreement or difference; Mill, 
1948) applied to the most similar system analyses at the subsystem level, which help control 
for other explanatory factors (Levi-Faur, 2006).  
As our analysis starts with paired comparisons at the hospital level, we code high (R) or low 
(r) refusal rates comparing large with small hospitals individually for each region. Although 
dichotomization implies a loss of information (Goertz, 2006), it captures the essential 
differences between small and big hospitals, is a wide-spread practice for pairwise 
comparisons (Tarrow, 2010), and seems appropriate for the use of CMA. The outcomes we 
seek to explain are low refusal rates (r) in each region. 
Furthermore, Table 3 clarifies the research questions that emerge at each analytical level: 
following the bottom-up, stepwise procedure of CMA, we first seek to explain low refusal 
rates in interdependent hospitals at the subsystem level. At the system I (regions) and II 
(nations) levels, we account for possible non-linearity by asking whether context matters for 
differences in the ways in which policy instruments affect relatives’ responses between 
independent cases. Lastly we tackle the question, how to address the limited diversity that 
followed from accounting for numerous possibly relevant contextual factors, by referring to 
the overarching first order characteristic of explicitness.  
 
- Table 3 here – 
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4 Results 
4.1 Intrasystem analyses 
A first intrasystem analysis compares large and small hospitals in German-speaking 
Switzerland. Applying the most similar systems strategy and Mill’s method of difference, we 
can infer from Table 1 that no active family approach (fam), which prevails both with low and 
high refusal rates, is no critical variable (Levi-Faur, 2006, p. 58). Instead, two variables 
account for the comparatively lower refusal rates in large German-speaking hospitals: donors 
are not transferred to a different retrieval hospital (t), and the donor coordinators are 
adequately reimbursed for their activities (RC). We can formulate a first comparative 
expression: 
 
CH-GE: RC, t → r       (expression 1) 
 
In the Latin part of Switzerland, only the lack of donor transfer (t) accounts for lower refusal 
rates in large hospitals – neither the family approach nor the fact that donor coordinators are 
reimbursed can explain the different refusal rates. The second comparative expression reads 
as follows: 
 
CH-L:  t → r        (expression 2) 
 
In our third intrasystem analysis, small and large hospitals in Spain are compared using a 
most similar systems strategy and Mill’s method of agreement (Levi-Faur, 2006). Yet, as the 
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policy instruments do not vary, none of them can be singled out as irrelevant. Hence, low 
refusal rates in this context can be explained by an adequate coordinator reimbursement (RC), 
an active family approach (FAM), and no donor transfer (t): 
 
ESP:  FAM, RC, t → r       (expression 3) 
4.2 Intersystem analyses 
To assess whether context matters, we formulate expressions for the grouped comparisons 
using square brackets (Denk, 2010, pp. 33f). The regional contextual factor “education of 
hospital staff” (systemic level I) precedes the causal relationship between explanatory factors 
and outcome represented by the comparative expression inside the brackets:  
 
CH-GE:  edu [RC, t → r] 
CH-L:   EDU [t → r] 
ESP regions:   EDU [FAM, RC, t → r]    (formalization 1) 
 
Based on formalization 1, we perform a first regional intersystem analysis between the two 
Swiss regions. We find that context matters, as in different contexts (D) different conditions 
(D) have the same effect (S), indicating equifinality: 
 
Intersystem analysis 1: DDS = DD. 
 
The combination DD denotes the result of this comparison. The first letter of the combination 
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expresses differences or similarities in context; the second indicates differences or similarities 
in the causal expressions. Since we only explain low refusal rates (r) the difference derives 
from the cause, not from the effect.  
As Denk and Lehtinen (2013, p. 7) point out, “the context may be a conditional condition for 
relationships between some conditions and the outcome, while other conditions have 
relationships with the same outcome independent of the context”. While the abandonment of 
donor transfer (t) is relevant in both contexts, an adequate reimbursement of the donor 
coordinators performing the donation request (RC) only contributes to lower refusal rates 
when the overall sensitization of the hospital staff for organ donation is low (edu). The 
decisive contextual condition for the effect of RC is the less comprehensive education of 
hospital staff in German-speaking Switzerland (edu), suggesting that low awareness might 
make staff more amenable to financial incentives.  
To cross-validate our findings, we compare German-speaking Switzerland with Spanish 
regions in a second regional intersystem analysis. Again, the summary of the two expressions 
suggests that context matters: 
 
Intersystem analysis 2: DDS = DD. 
 
Only in the context of a comprehensive staff education (EDU) in Spanish regions does the 
active family approach (FAM) unfold its causal role. In contrast to the findings of the first 
intersystem analysis, both adequate reimbursement (RC) and no donor transfer (t) appear 
causally relevant for low refusal rates in these two contexts. The causal role of coordinator 
reimbursement (RC) persists independently of the comprehensiveness of staff education 
(EDU or edu). Hence, rather than validating the results of the first intersystem analysis, the 
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second intersystem analysis yields a different conclusion.  
This result puts into question the role of edu as a contingent necessary condition for RC to 
impact on refusal rates. Different layers of context can interact with each other (Falletti and 
Lynch, 2009, p.14): the contextual effect of education for the causal relationship between RC 
and r detected above may persist only in the Swiss national context. 
Note that the CMA analysis would have ended without shedding light on this non-linearity if 
we had not included the Spanish context for cross-validation. This experience suggests that, 
while CMA can detect contextual effects, issues of limited diversity may still limit the 
robustness of the findings. Depending on the research setting, it might therefore be advisable 
to compare more than just two contexts. Denk and Lehtinen (2013) do so, but they do not 
explain how to deal with inconclusive contextual effects. 
We then conduct a third regional intersystem analysis by comparing Latin-speaking 
Switzerland with Spanish regions. We find that different factors yield the same outcome in a 
similar context – that is, equifinality within similar contexts. Denk (2010) did not foresee this 
scenario (Rohlfing, 2012): 
 
Intersystem analysis 3: SDS = SD. 
 
This SD scenario is another indicator that a different context than the one examined might 
matter. Hence, we explore the possibility that the relevant contextual conditions are situated at 
the national level. We thus take CMA one step further by analyzing contexts at two levels. 
Another pair of square brackets designates the second contextual system level with the 
national policy factors preceding these brackets. The logical operator “OR”, designated by the 
Boolean + operator (cf. Goertz, 2006), summarizes the situation in the Swiss context.  
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CH:   ar, qm, cc, pc    [edu    [RC, t → r]] + [EDU  [t → r]] 
ESP:    AR, QM, CC, PC  [EDU [FAM, RC, t → r]] (formalization 2) 
 
Based on formalization 2, we perform a fourth intersystem analysis to examine the role of the 
national context: 
 
Intersystem analysis 4: DDS = DD. 
 
We find that different conditions lead to a similar outcome in different national contexts, 
which, hence, matter. While the absence of donor transfer (t) leads to low refusal rates in both 
contexts, only in the Spanish context an active family approach (FAM) contributes to low 
refusal rates. The Spanish context comprises active public awareness raising (AR), 
comprehensive quality monitoring (QM), consistent cost coverage (CC), and the legal model 
of presumed consent (PC). Conversely, the absence of an active family approach in 
Switzerland does not appear causally relevant for differences in refusal rates.   
4.3 Addressing limited diversity 
Without knowing which (combination) of these national policy instruments is decisive, it is 
difficult to interpret the above contextual statement substantially. CMA itself offers no tool to 
identify the relative relevance of contextual conditions. We resort to higher order constructs 
(Goertz, 2006) to answer our last question: How to address limited diversity at the context 
level?  
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We thus rewrite formalization 2 in terms of types and varieties of policy instruments. For 
example, since all policy instruments representing sermons (type) are explicit (variety) in 
Spain and non-explicit in Switzerland, we denote them with SERM and serm respectively.  
 
CH: serm, carr, sticks  [serm + SERM [CARR → r]]  
ESP:  SERM, CARR, STICKS [SERM [SERM, CARR → r]]      (formalization 3) 
 
The resulting formalization 3 is more insightful and easier to interpret than formalization 2. At 
the hospital level, positive incentives (CARR) contribute to low refusal rates, independent of 
the context (linear effect). In addition, in Spain, the fact that hospitals provide explicit, but 
non-compulsory information (SERM) when performing the family approach accounts for low 
refusal rates. The national context comprising explicit instruments acts as a contingent 
necessary condition for this effect, which does not exist in Switzerland.  
Formalization 3 thus strongly suggests that it is not different types (sermons, sticks or 
carrots), but the explicitness of policy instruments at the national level which forms the 
relevant context. The types of policy instruments we observed as second-order factors are 
themselves substitutable instances of the underlying first-order context “explicitness” (Cioffi-
Revilla & Starr, 2003). In substantial terms, the comparison of Switzerland and Spain 
indicates, first, that incentives may lower refusal rates. Second, the context of a state 
explicitly and comprehensively supporting the goal of organ donation is needed for voluntary 
information measures to, first, be explicit and, second, unfold an effect on refusal rates. This 
context affects whether people perceive the provided information as credible (Spain) or 
irrelevant (Switzerland). This conclusion is straightforward to grasp and may be of a high 
relevance for policy makers.  
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5 Discussion 
Denk’s (2010) Comparative Multilevel Analysis is a recent innovation in small-N research 
that helps researchers to compare cases across contexts. This study shows how CMA 
identifies whether causal patterns are linear, i.e. hold across contexts, or non-linear, i.e. 
depend upon relevant contextual variables arising from interdependencies between cases 
(Ross & Homer, 1976). We clarified that CMA assesses whether context changes meaning as 
a contingent necessary condition for a causal relationship at the subsystem level, but not 
whether context is itself a cause of the outcome. We used Levi-Faur’s (2006) inferential 
strategies for pairwise comparisons to explain low refusal rates to organ donation in different 
contexts, and tested CMA’s usefulness to discover whether context matters. Despite its 
potential to account for context-bound causality, we also demonstrated several limits of the 
CMA methodology and propose three practical refinements.  
First, we encountered equifinality, which should be accounted for more systematically by 
CMA (refinement 1). Second, contextual effects uncovered by CMA can be inconclusive 
because of limited diversity. Hence, to reach more conclusive results and to enhance their 
robustness, we propose to validate the analysis by extending it to several contexts (refinement 
2). We have shown one way in which CMA can be applied to multi-stage contexts. However, 
third, CMA reached its limits in handling a high number of contextual factors at the national 
level. We propose a complementary strategy (refinement 3): The number of contextual (and 
causal) conditions can be reduced, and their role as first- or second order causal factors 
clarified, by creating higher-order constructs (Cioffi-Revilla & Starr, 2003; Goertz, 2006; 
Ragin, 2000). 
Thereby, we detected a more general pattern underlying the relationship between policy 
instruments and refusal rates to organ donation. Our findings illustrate how policy design 
needs to be contextually embedded to show effect. Specific incentives may lower refusal rates 
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independently of the context. However, information measures only influence refusal rates in a 
context of a “credible” state that explicitly and comprehensively supports the goal of organ 
donation (Engeli & Varone, 2011; Howlett, 2009). CMA has helped us to reveal such 
patterns, which are difficult to anticipate by general policy models (Voss et al., 2009). To 
capitalize on the well-documented effect of the family approach on refusal rates, regional and 
national policymakers must hence consistently communicate the desirability of the goal of 
organ donation, rather than cherry-picking single elements of the Spanish model.  
6 Conclusion 
The application of CMA to comparisons of a small number of cases may help researchers to 
tackle Galton’s problem and context-bound causality by systematizing the complex 
qualitative data in a way that uncovers contexual effects on causal relationships within 
subsystems. To address limited diversity in complex contexts, one of CMA’s main advantages 
is that it can easily be complemented with other techniques (Denk & Lehtinen, 2013, p. 7). 
Limited empirical diversity can be addressed by increasing the number of cases, reducing the 
number of variables, or resorting to higher-level constructs. This paper has suggested and 
illustrated ways in which this can be fruitfully done to isolate complex causal and multilevel 
contextual patterns. 
 
21 
 
References 
Blatter, J. & Haverland, M. (2012). Designing Case Studies: Explanatory Approaches in 
Small-N Research. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Braun, D. & Gilardi, F. (2006). Taking ‘Galton's Problem’ Seriously. Towards a Theory of 
Policy Diffusion. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 18(3), 298-322. 
Byrne, D. (2009). Complex Realist and Configurational Approaches to Cases: A Radical 
Synthesis. In D. Byrne & C. C. Ragin (Eds.). The SAGE Handbook of Case-Based 
Methods (pp. 101-111). London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi and Singapore: Sage. 
Cioffi-Revilla, C. and Starr, H. (2003). Opportunity, Willingness, and Political Uncertainty: 
Theoretical Foundations of Politics. In G. Goertz & H. Starr (Eds.), Necessary 
Conditions. Theory, Methodology and Applications (pp. 225-248). New York: 
Rowman & Littlefield. 
Council of Europe. 2011. Newsletter Transplant 2011. International Figures on Donation and 
Transplantation – 2010. Retrieved July 20, 2014 
(http://www.ont.es/publicaciones/Documents/Newsletter2011.pdf). 
Denk, T. (2010). Comparative Multilevel Analysis: proposal for a methodology. International 
Journal of Social Research Methodology, 13(1), 29-39. 
Denk, T. & Lehtinen, S. (2013). Contextual analyses with QCA-methods. Quality & Quantity: 
1-13, DOI 10.1007/s11135-013-9968-4. 
Engeli, I. & Varone, F. (2011). Governing morality issues through procedural policies. Swiss 
Political Science Review 17(3), 239-258. 
Falletti, T. & Lynch, J. (2009). Context and Causal Mechanisms in Political Analysis. 
Comparative Political Studies, 42(9), 1143-1166. 
22 
 
Glennan, S. (2010). Mechanisms, causes, and the layered model of the world. Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 81(2 (2), 362-381. 
Goertz, G. (1994). Contexts of International Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Goertz, G. (2006). Social Science Concepts. A User's Guide. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press. 
Goertz, G. & Starr, H. (2003). Necessary Conditions: Theory, Methodology, and Applications. 
New York: Rowman & Littlefield. 
Lascoumes, P. & Le Galès, P. (2007). Introduction: understanding public policy through its 
instruments—from the nature of instruments to the sociology of public policy 
instrumentation. Governance 20(1), 1-21. 
Howlett, M. (2009). Governance modes, policy regimes and operational plans: A multi-level 
nested model of policy instrument choice and policy design. Policy Sciences 42(1), 73-
89. 
Levi-Faur, D. (2006). A Question of Size? A Heuristics for Stepwise Comparative Research 
Design. In B. Rihoux & H. Grimm (Eds.). Innovative Comparative Methods for Policy 
Analysis (pp. 43-66). New York: Springer. 
Mill, S. J. (1843). A System of Logic. London: Harrison and co. printers. 
ONT (2008). Actividád de Donación 2008. Madrid : Organización Nacional de Trasplantes 
ONT. 
ONT (2009). Programa de garantía de calidad del proceso de donación. Memoria de 
resultados de la autoevaluación año 2009. Madrid: Organización Nacional de 
Trasplantes ONT. 
Pawson, R. (2002). Evidence-based policy: The promise of realist synthesis. Evaluation 8(3), 
23 
 
340-358. 
Peters, B. G. (1998). Comparative politics, theory and methods. Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
Ragin, C. (2000). Fuzzy-Set Social Science. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Rohlfing, I. (2012). Analyzing multilevel data with QCA: a straightforward procedure. 
International Journal of Social Research Methodology, 15(6), 497-506. 
Ross, M.C. & Homer, E. (1976). Galton’s problem in cross-national research. World Politics, 
29(1), 1-28. 
Swisstransplant (2009). Jahresbericht 2009. Retrieved July 20, 2014 
(http://www.swisstransplant.org/l1/organspende-organ-transplantation-zuteilung-
koordination-warteliste-statistiken.php). 
Tarrow, S. (2010). The strategy of paired comparison: Toward a theory of practice. 
Comparative Political Studies, 43(2), 230-259. 
Vedung, E. (1998). Policy Instruments: Typologies and Theories. In M.-L. Bemelmans-Videc, 
Rist, R. C. & Vedung, E. (Eds.). Carrots, Sticks and Sermons: Policy Instruments and 
their Evaluation (pp. 21-58). New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers. 
Voß, J., Smith, A. & Grin, J. (2009). Designing long-term policy: rethinking transition 
management. Policy Sciences, 42(4), 275-302. 
X. (2011). Blinded author reference. 
 
  
24 
 
Tables in Text 
 
Table 1 Research setting, policy instruments and refusal rates 
Level of 
analysis 
Policy  
instrument 
CH 
Context 4 
ESP 
Context 5 
System II 
(national) 
Active public 
awareness 
raising   
ar ar ar ar AR AR 
 Quality 
monitoring 
qm qm qm qm QM QM 
 Cost coverage  cc cc cc cc CC CC 
 Presumed 
consent 
pc pc pc pc PC PC 
  CH-GE 
Context 1 
CH-L 
Context 2 
ESP 
Context 3 
System I (CH 
& ESP 
regions) 
Comprehensi
ve education 
of hospital 
staff 
edu edu EDU EDU EDU EDU 
  Large 
hospitals 
Small 
hospitals 
Large 
hospitals 
Small 
hospitals 
Large 
hospitals 
Small 
hospitals 
Subsystem 
(cases) 
Active family 
approach  
fam fam fam fam FAM FAM 
 Donor 
coordinator 
eimburse-
ment  
RC rc RC RC RC RC 
 Donor 
transfer for 
retrieval 
t T t T t t 
 Refusal rate 49.0% 78.0% 28.4% 75.0% 19.8% 16.2% 
Legend: Capital letters = policy instrument is applied. Lower case letters = policy instrument is not applied. 
Notes: CH: Switzerland, CH-GE: German part of Switzerland, CH-L: Latin (i.e. French and Italian) part of 
Switzerland, ESP: Spain. Refusal rate = number of refusals by next of kin as share of total requests (in per cent). 
Data sources: Swiss Donor Action (mean of 2007, 2008, 2009), Organicazión Nacional de Trasplantes (ONT 
2009). 
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Table 2 Types and varieties of policy instruments 
B
a
si
c 
L
ev
el
 
Extent to 
which state 
influences 
policy goal 
(varieties) 
EXPLICIT non-explicit 
S
ec
o
n
d
a
ry
 
L
ev
el
 
Coerciveness 
(types) 
 
Sermons Sticks Carrots Sermons Sticks Carrots 
In
d
ic
a
to
r 
L
ev
el
 
Single policy 
instruments 
EDU 
QM 
AR 
FAM 
PC RC 
t 
CC 
edu 
qm 
ar 
fam 
pc T 
rc 
cc 
Notes: Own illustration based on Vedung (1998) and Goertz (2006).  
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Table 3 Analytical questions and strategy  
3. How to address limited diversity at the context level? 
Comparing all formulizations 1) using single policy instruments, and 2) higher order constructs  
2. Does context matter? 
Analytical step INTER4 
System II      
(nations) 
Context 4 Context 5 
INTER2 & 3 
INTER1  
System I      
(regions) 
Context 1 Context 2 Context 3 
1. What explains the Outcome (r)? 
Analytical step INTRA1 INTRA2 INTRA3 
Inferential 
strategy 
MSSD + MMD MSSD + MMD MSSD + MMA 
Subsystem   
(cases) 
LH SH LH SH LH SH 
Outcome 
r R r R r r 
Notes: R: high refusal rate. r: low refusal rate. LH: large hospitals, SH: small hospitals. MSSD: Most similar 
systems design. MMD: Mill’s method of difference. MMA: Mill’s method of agreement. 
 
